Nuclear Testing Claims: Separating Fact from Fiction
President Trump has recently suggested that the United States should resume nuclear weapons testing, citing concerns that other nations are already conducting such tests. This claim deserves careful examination, as it touches on critical matters of national security, international relations, and global stability. According to scientific evidence and monitoring data from international organizations, there is little support for the assertion that other countries are currently conducting nuclear test explosions. The global moratorium on nuclear testing has largely held firm since the 1990s, with only North Korea conducting confirmed nuclear tests in the 21st century. Understanding the realities of global nuclear testing is essential as we consider the potential consequences of resuming such activities after decades of restraint.
The international community has established sophisticated systems to detect nuclear explosions worldwide, making it extremely difficult for any nation to conduct tests without detection. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) operates an International Monitoring System with over 300 facilities that use seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide technologies to detect even small nuclear explosions. This network can identify underground, underwater, or atmospheric tests with remarkable sensitivity, and it has successfully detected all of North Korea’s nuclear tests, including their first test in 2006, which had a yield of less than one kiloton. Additionally, national intelligence agencies, independent seismologists, and satellite surveillance provide overlapping capabilities to verify compliance with testing moratoriums. Given these extensive monitoring systems, claims about undetected nuclear testing by major powers require extraordinary evidence.
The United States last conducted a nuclear test in 1992 before adopting a testing moratorium, while Russia’s last test was in 1990. China conducted its final test in 1996 before joining the moratorium. These three nuclear powers, along with France and the United Kingdom, have maintained their nuclear arsenals through computer simulations, subcritical experiments (which don’t produce nuclear chain reactions), and other non-explosive testing methods. The scientific consensus indicates that these alternative approaches have been sufficient to maintain the safety and reliability of nuclear stockpiles without full-scale testing. The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program, established in 1995, has successfully certified the U.S. nuclear arsenal’s reliability each year without nuclear explosive testing, using advanced computational modeling and experimental facilities that were not available during the era of active testing.
Resuming nuclear testing would carry significant diplomatic and security costs for the United States. Such a move would likely trigger similar actions by Russia and China, potentially sparking a new nuclear arms race. It would undermine decades of nonproliferation efforts, making it harder to constrain countries like North Korea and Iran. America’s allies, particularly those who have advocated for nuclear restraint, would face difficult questions about their continued security partnerships with the U.S. The international backlash could weaken America’s leadership position on other global issues, from climate change to trade. Furthermore, nuclear tests release radioactive material that can have long-term environmental and health consequences, as demonstrated by the legacy of testing in the American Southwest, the Marshall Islands, and other test sites around the world.
Allegations of clandestine testing by Russia or China have surfaced periodically but remain unsubstantiated by scientific evidence. In 2019, concerns were raised about Russian activities at remote test sites, but the U.S. Intelligence Community did not confirm these suspicions, and the detected activities were consistent with permitted subcritical experiments. Similarly, questions about Chinese activities at its Lop Nur test site have not been backed by seismic or radiological evidence of nuclear explosions. While both countries maintain their test sites and conduct allowed subcritical experiments, the scientific data do not support claims that they are violating the testing moratorium. Transparency concerns exist about these activities, but they differ fundamentally from accusations of actual nuclear explosive testing.
The decision about whether to resume nuclear testing represents a critical choice about America’s role in the world and its commitment to reducing nuclear dangers. Rather than acting on unsubstantiated claims about other countries’ testing activities, a more productive approach might involve pursuing diplomatic engagement to address compliance concerns, strengthening verification capabilities, and continuing to invest in stockpile stewardship technologies. The United States has maintained a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for three decades without explosive testing. Before abandoning this successful approach, policymakers should carefully weigh the technical benefits against the substantial diplomatic, security, and environmental costs. Such momentous decisions require a foundation of factual evidence rather than speculation, especially when they involve weapons of unprecedented destructive capability.
